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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONTRACT PRECAUTIONS
David A. Hoffman* & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan**

Abstract: This research tests the intuition that parties to a contract
approach each other differently before the contract is formed than they do
once it is finalized. We argue that one of the most important determinants of
self-protective behavior is whether the promisee considers herself to be in
negotiations or already in an ongoing contract relationship. That shift affects
precaution-taking even when it has no practical bearing on the costs and
benefits of self-protection: the moment of contracting is a reference point that
frames the costs and benefits of taking precautions. We present the results of
three questionnaire studies in which respondents indicate that they would be
more likely to protect their own interests—by requesting a liquidated damages
clause, by purchasing a warranty, or by shopping around to ensure the best
deal—when the contract is not yet finalized than they would when they
understand the agreement to be finalized. We discuss competing explanations
for this phenomenon, including both prospect theory and cognitive
dissonance. Finally, we explore some doctrinal implications for work on
disclosure, modification, and promissory estoppel.
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Before the contract is signed, the parties confront each other with a natural
wariness. Neither expects the other to be particularly forthcoming, and
therefore there is no deception when one is not. Afterwards the situation is
different. The parties are now in a cooperative relationship the costs of
which will be considerably reduced by a measure of trust. So each lowers
his guard a little bit, and now silence is more apt to be deceptive . . .
Market Street Associates Limited Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir.
1991) (Posner, J.)
This Article explores one of the central tensions in contract law and policy:
are counterparties adversaries or partners? On the one hand, courts and
lawmakers have worried for decades about parties‘ blithe willingness to make
themselves vulnerable to exploitation.1 The first year contracts course is
populated by a parade of promisees who believe in contracts that do not exist,2
agree to outrageous terms that they could not possibly fulfill,3 and over-rely on
promises that leave them undercompensated when the promisor breaches. 4
Even though most consumers would readily endorse the exhortation of caveat
emptor, there is evidence that they fail to protect themselves across a variety of
contractual dealings, with costly results. On the other hand, there are good
reasons to think that over-formalization, and over-protection, are harmful as
well. Relying on social norms and interpersonal trust may actually be the most
efficient approach for many kinds of contracts.
We approach the contract relationship from the perspective of the
consumer or promisee, and ask how and when individuals protect themselves
from contractual harms including breach and exploitation. We hypothesize
that one of the most important determinants of self-protective behavior is
whether the promisee considers herself to be in negotiations or already in an
ongoing contract relationship. That shift affects precaution-taking even when
it has no practical bearing on the costs and benefits of self-protection. Put
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981) (providing a remedy for parties who
reasonably relied on representations made by parties under an otherwise unenforceable
agreement; Marco J. Jiminez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REV. 669, 671 (2010) (examining over 300
promissory estoppel cases over a 30 year period to determine how judges conceive of
equitable claims).
2 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 26 Wis. 2n 683 (Wisc. 1965) (awarding
damages in equity where the defendant encouraged the plaintiff to rely on its unenforceable
promise).
3 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(invalidating a contract where terms were unreasonably favorable for the defendant).
4 See, e.g., Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Mining Co., 385 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962) (awarding
damages as the diminution in market price of land where performance would be more costly
than the value of the completed contract).
1
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differently, the moment of contracting is a reference point: at moments before
contracting, we take precautions against harm; afterwards, we lower our
defenses.
This research tests and expands on Judge Posner‘s intuition, expressed in
Market Street Associates, that parties feel and act differently before and after
entering contracts.5 We build on three interlocking scholarly traditions. First,
there is a new literature on contracts as prospect theory reference points that
frame the parties‘ judgments of the costs and benefits of the deal.6 This
reference point evidence complements the powerful relational contracting
literature, which argued that commercial parties behave as if long-term
contracts are partnerships, and often forgo legal opportunities to take
exploitative gains.7 Finally, the growing understanding that individuals perceive
contracts as a set of bilateral moral commitments, rather than merely options
to pay or perform, strongly suggests that lay people believe that contract
formation has moral implications.8
Understanding contract formation as a reference point sheds new light on
several important live problems in contract doctrine and policy. For example,
there is a growing field of scholarship worrying about the common practice of
unilateral modifications in common consumer contracts. As David Horton
shows, credit card companies were able to roll out arbitration clauses as
modifications to existing contracts, overcoming initial court resistance through
sophisticated lawyering.9 This has been deemed worrisome enough that Oren
Bar-Gill and Kevin Davis have proposed a third-party monitoring mechanism
to remedy such un-policed unilateral modifications, the ―Change Approval
Board.‖10 Peter Alces and Michael Greenfield have collected examples of
unilateral modifications across multiple consumer channels and argued that
courts should reinvigorate the doctrine of good faith.11 These kinds of
Market Street Associates Limited Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1991).
Oliver Hart and John Moore , Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2008);
Oliver Hart, John Moore and Christian Zehnder, Contracts as Reference Points -- Experimental
Evidence, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 493 (2011); Doron Teichman, Yuval Feldman and Amos
Schurr, Reference Points and Contractual Interpretation: An Empirical Examination, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1989556 (last visited Feb. 9, 2012)
(finding that framing payoffs as losses tends to encourage self-serving interpretation of
contract language).
7 See infra at text accompanying notes 82 through 83.
8 See infra Section 3.3
9 David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA
L. REV. 605, 665-66 (2010); David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437
(2011).
10 Oren Bar-Gill & Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 37 (2010).
11 Peter A. Alces & Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do What!? Limitations on the Use of
Change-of-Terms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099 (2010).
5
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proposals are motivated by the sense that unilateral modifications are unlikely
to be welfare-maximizing, and that they often exploit consumers‘ cognitive
biases.12 But it has been unclear exactly which cognitive biases affect a
consumer‘s ability to evaluate modifications.13 What‘s so psychologically
special about unilateral modification? Our research situates the problem of
assent to modification within the broader class of contracts decisions that
people approach skeptically outside of contract but readily accept once the
main agreement has been signed.
The approach advocated here also bears on a related debate over the
merits of mandatory term disclosure. Armed with evidence that consumers
essentially never read licenses, contracts, or warranties, opponents of
mandatory disclosure have begun to make inroads against one of the most
popular regulatory approaches to voluntary transactions.14 Others defend
disclosure, arguing that it is a cheap and harmless foundation for
enforcement.15 We suggest that consumers see the relevant terms differently
depending on when they are presented. Many of the most controversial cases
tug at the intuition that terms that follow formation—think Carnival Cruise
Lines16—are particularly problematic. Once parties understand that the
contract has been formed, they are especially unlikely to take care. In fact,
clever promisors might be able to manipulate precautionary behavior by
making the most salient moment of contracting (for example, signing forms or
exchanging a good for money) precede revelations of objectionable terms. In
that way, firms can reduce the likelihood that the consumers will engage in
self-protective behavior like reading the contract, or shopping around, without
exposing themselves to legal sanctions. As such, reference point theory
exposes how contract law‘s relentlessly objective focus could permit
sophisticated parties to manipulate the timing of disclosures without offending
the legal requirement of mutual assent.
In some ways, the idea that formation reorients parties‘ expectations seems
so anodyne that it may not warrant empirical investigation. However, this
See Bar-Gill & Davis supra, note 13 at 20 (―[M]ost consumers are imperfectly informed
or imperfectly rational, and as a result they misperceive the risk of unilateral modifications.‖);
Horton supra, note 12 at 648 (―[There] is growing acceptance that bounded rationality prevents
even informed adherents from making welfare-maximizing choices.‖).
13 See Horton supra, note 12 at 645-648 (attributing inefficiency in consumer‘s decisions to
the failure to read the terms at issue, unreasonable optimism, and irrationality).
14 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U.
PA. L. REV. 647, 647 (2010) ; Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the “Opportunity to Read” in Contract
Law, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1, 13-21 (2009); Ronald J. Mann and Travis Siebeneicher, Just One
Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 998-1001 (2008).
15 See, e.g., Robert Hillman and Maureen O‘Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 106-108 (2011).
16 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
12
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Article not only demonstrates that the intuition has bite across an array of
precautionary decisions, but that it cannot be explained by straightforward
analysis of economic costs and benefits, even when we take into account
transactions costs. We proceed as follows. In Part 1 of this Article, we argue
that the extant literature on self-protective behavior by contracting parties,
loosely organized around the term ―precautions‖ ignores the psychological
dimensions of self-protection in contract, and we suggest that existing
behavioral evidence helps explain why contract formation might affect
precautions.
In Part 2, we present the results of three questionnaire studies in which
respondents indicate that they would be more likely to protect their own
interests—via a liquidated damages clause, warranty, or shopping around—
when the contract is under negotiation than they would when they understand
the agreement to be finalized. Our goal in this experimental series is to control
for economic justifications for Judge Posner‘s intuition, including transaction
costs and the anticipated legal remedies that parties might obtain in contracts
(rather than in negotiations). We are left with a decrease in precautionary
behavior contingent on the promisee‘s belief that a contract has been formed,
a phenomenon which cannot be easily explained by the economic incentives.
In Part 3, we draw lessons from existing psychology and experimental
economics research and consider their applications to the contracts context.
Research on prospect theory, particularly on loss aversion and the status quo
bias, may help explain why parties might be willing to expend resources before
the contract is signed, but be reluctant to incur what they perceive as an
additional loss once the deal is done. We also consider the possibility,
bolstered by research on cognitive dissonance and confirmation bias, that
people implicitly or explicitly subscribe to a behavioral rule of thumb that
favors wariness in the selection phase of contract and trust in the execution
phase. Finally, in Part 4, we lay out some of the real world applications of our
findings, and discuss the limitations of our work.
1. Self-Interest and Precaution
1.1

Defining Precautions

This Article is about how and when parties, promisees in particular, take
precautions in contract. As a general matter, when we think about contract
precautions, the examples that come easily to mind are the protections against
breach by commercial actors. Developers purchase insurance against
construction delays; companies monitor workers to guard against shirking;
retailers can source goods from multiple manufacturers to reduce the harm of
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any one problem in the supply chain. 17 These examples lend themselves nicely
to economic or game theoretic analyses of optimal precaution-taking,18 but
they give the false impression that precautions are only relevant for a small
fraction of contracts.
Ordinary consumers make many choices about investing in precautions.
Precautions can be general or specific. Health and homeowners insurance
remediate injuries (including ones generated by breach) that the law may
undercompensate; customers purchase shipping insurance to supplement the
declared value of their packages.19 Typically, however, formal insurance against
breach is relatively expensive for the promisee to purchase, in part because it is
so difficult to monitor the promisor‘s behavior.20 There is also evidence that
individuals typically are underinsured against catastrophic breaches, in part
because of the kinds of decision biases that we explore later in this paper.21
Promisees can also take precautions that are internal to the contractual
relationship. Before contracting, they can select against the likelihood of
breach using various methods: third-party providers, social connections,
evidence of brand strength, or face-to-face signals of trustworthiness.22 When
they perceive their counterparties to be less trustworthy, they may pay less for
performance.23 Or promisees can ask for contractual terms that will reduce the
likelihood of breach, the harm that it will cause, or will increase the damages
See David Campbell, A Relational Critique of the Third Restatement of Restitution § 39, 68
WLLR 1063, 1112 (2011) (explaining that a potential plaintiff may wish to minimize the risk of
loss from breach by obtaining additional insurance or contracting with multiple suppliers). But
see Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1381, 1385
(2009) (―[T]he promisee is an imperfect monitor and is unlikely to detect the monitor‘s lack of
precaution.‖).
18 See, e.g., George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80
Tul. L. Rev. 1109, 1158 (2006) (arguing that default rules could be mapped onto efficient
precautions parties take during negotiations).
19 See, e.g., http://www.shipsurance.com/shipping_insurance.asp
20 Steve Thel and Peter Siegelman, You Do Have To Keep Your Promises: A Disgorgement
Theory of Contract Remedies, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1181, 1231 (2011). Impracticability is often
cited as an example of the interplay between promisee‘s insurance (or lack of it) and the
promisor‘s discharge. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 92 (1977)
21 Howard Kunreuther, Robert Meyer and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, Overcoming Decision
Biases to Reduce Losses from Natural Catastrophes, in BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY (E.
Shafir (ed.), Princeton University Press, in press, 2012).
22 See, e.g., Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, UCLA L.
Rev. 1193, 1219 (1994) (explaining that manufacturers heavily invest in branding in order to
create a positive reputation on which consumers will rely).
23 But see Campbell supra, note 20 at 1112 (―Now, if the risk of idiosyncratic loss is high,
the potential plaintiff may pay the higher price for the [good for which the party is
contracting], because the extra security, and ultimately the extra precaution, will be of value to
him.‖).
17
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that the law permits.24 Alternatively, they may invest less in reliance on the
contract.25
Later in this Article, we will suggest that promisees might take precautions
against counterparty actions that don't rise to the level of legal breach. Before
doing so, we first ask how legal economists have approached the problem of
guarding oneself against actions that the law also remedies.
1.2

Why Not Take Precautions: The Economic Explanation

Most discussions of precautions ask when self-protection against breach is
economically justified. The literature on optimal precautions in the law and
economics tradition is well-developed,26 noted for its sophistication but
criticized for its indeterminacy.27 It generally focuses on the complex
relationship between the default rule of damages (reliance or expectation) and
how much the parties will invest in the bargain after it has been made.28 The
idea is that people will take precautions if they think that they will be
undercompensated in the event of breach. Authors usually assume risk
neutrality, perfect information, rational parties, and fully compensatory damage
regimes.29 Under these assumptions, we may general expect that parties will
invest in precautions in ways that do not maximize their joint welfare. In
particular, we expect moral hazard.

Cf. FedEx Express Terms and Conditions; FedEx Ground Tariff, available at
http://www.fedex.com/us/service-guide/terms/express-ground/index.html ("The declared
value of any package represents our maximum liability in connection with a shipment of that
package, including, but not limited to, any loss, damage, delay, misdelivery, nondelivery,
misinformation, any failure to provide information, or misdelivery of information relating to
the shipment. It is the shipper‘s responsibility to prove actual damages. Exposure to and risk
of any loss in excess of the declared value is assumed by the shipper. You may transfer this
risk to an insurance carrier of your choice through the purchase of an insurance policy.
Contact an insurance agent or broker if you desire insurance coverage. WE DO NOT
PROVIDE INSURANCE COVERAGE OF ANY KIND.")
25 See Francesco Parisi et al., Optimal Remedies for Bilateral Contracts, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 245,
249 (2011) (explaining that in some bilateral contracts parties who do not trust that the other
contracting party will perform have an incentive to withhold performance rather than invest in
the contract).
26 For a useful summary, see Richard Craswell, The “Incomplete Contracts” Literature and
Efficient Precautions, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 151, 159 (2005).
27 For a classic statement of the indeterminacy position, see Eric A. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 836-39(2003).
28 Typically in the literature, authors focus take promisors‘ precautions to be investments
to avoid breach, while the promisee‘s precautions are the amount that it relies on the bargain.
George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA . L . REV. 1225, 1235 (1994)
29 Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 469-70
(1980).
24
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Both the expectation and the reliance measures of damage may cause the
promisee who anticipates breach to rely too much and take too few
precautions.30 That is, because the promisee is in effect insured against losses
by contract damages, she will overinvest in her own performance and turn an
efficient bargain into one the promisor would not have originally entered into.
Conversely, the promisor may spend less to prevent breach than is otherwise
optimal.31 Thus, if parties are unable to modify the default regime, damage
remedies inevitably will cause one of the parties to behave inefficiently.
This relationship between precautions and damages has particularly stark
implications for pre-contractual reliance.32 Generally, given that contract
doctrine purportedly rarely compensates pre-contract reliance,33 parties will be
motivated to invest less in pre-contract investigation than they otherwise
would. Thus, scholars argue that the law encourages moral hazard and
opportunism by promisors.34 In this vein, Richard Craswell has argued that
selection is an important pre-contractual precaution; the promisee might select
away from risky promisors as a form of prevention against breach.35 Where
buyers and sellers are perfectly informed, of course, the law‘s remedies will not
influence such selection decisions.36 However, where the promisee is
imperfectly aware of the risk of the promisor‘s breach – as will almost always
be the case – the situation is more complex. As such imperfectly informed
promisees bear more risk of breach, they will be more risk averse and will buy
more expensive precautions (so long as they are aware of their lack of
knowledge); conversely their counterparties will be more risk seeking.37 The
consensus is that these insights about the relationship between doctrine and
Id. at 471.
Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 12-13 (1985) (describing effect).
32 The literature is helpfully summarized and critiqued by Ofer Grosskopf & Barak
Medina, Regulating Contract Formation: Precontractual Reliance, Sunk Costs, and Market Structure, 39
CONN. L. REV. 1977, 1992-95 (2007). Two classic papers are Richard Craswell, Precontractual
Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 402 (1988) (addressing the
effect of various damage measures on the parties‘ incentives to gather information prior to
contracting) and Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Omri Ben-Shahar, Precontractual Reliance, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 423, 424 (2001)
33 But cf. Anglia v. Reed, 3 All E.R. 690 (Court of Appeal, 1971).
34 Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, Moral Hazard, and Sunk Costs: A Default
Rule for Precontractual Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 635-41 (1993); Richard Shell,
Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44
VAND. L. REV. 221, 227, 251-64 (1991).
35 Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988).
36 Id. at 653-56.
37 Id. at 659-661; Richard Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation, 40 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1135, 1163-65 (2003) (discussing both selection and risk investigation as a form of
precaution).
30
31
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efficiency ought to lead to changes in the former to encourage promiseeprecaution taking,38 such as, for example, a more rigorous disclosure regime.39
The account that we offer here does is not necessarily in tension with the
economic literature, because our focus is on a phenomenon that the economic
account ignores altogether. We suggest that individuals approach the same
self-protective decision—for example, buying a warranty—differently
depending on whether they perceive the main contract to have been formed or
not. The warranty itself is a precaution that only takes effect once the contract
has been made, which means that the decision in either case assumes a world
in which the contract exists. The reference point, then, is about when parties
are making that precautions decision, before or after the core deal is made.
That is, we are not asking subjects to distinguish between precautions which
will be treated differently by the law. In fact, we readily agree that the
availability of remedies affects how promisees will act, but we are arguing that
even holding remedies constant, individuals are more protective when they are
negotiating than they are within the contract.
1.3

Why Not Take Precautions: The Psychological Explanation

Sometimes precautions are costly because they take a toll on the contract
relationship. Asking for a liquidated damages clause communicates concern
about breach, on the one hand, and a willingness to put a price on breach (thus
perhaps destigmatizing it), on the other.40 Monitoring one‘s counterparty
communicates distrust. Not only is this potentially an uncomfortable thing for
the monitoring party to do, it often has the result of decreasing the monitored
party‘s efforts.41 Parties subject to monitoring often report that the restriction
on freedom and the sense of distrust instantiate an essentially spiteful
response—the lack of trust is aggravating enough that they respond by
behaving in an untrustworthy manner.42
Indeed, the social and psychological pressures against precaution-taking
have already been studied in the context of conflict-of-interest disclosures.
See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, Contracts Without Consent: Exploring a New Basis For
Contractual Liability, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 1829, 1851-52 (2004) ("the no-retraction regime
improves the parties‘ incentives to make precontractual investments".); cf. Cohen, supra n. 28,
at 1251-55 (discussing how courts might infuse promisee‘s fault into doctrine as a way of
setting optimal precautions).
39 Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L REV. 1645, 1647 (2003); cf.
40 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment,
108 MICH L. REV. 633, 637 (2010)
41 Bruno S. Frey, Does Monitoring Increase Work Effort? The Rivalry with Trust and Loyalty, 31
ECON. INQUIRY 663 (1993).
42 Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, The Hidden Costs of Control, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 1611
(2006).
38
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When one party in a transaction reveals that she has a conflict of interest, how
does it affect the other party‘s choices? Daylian Cain and George Loewenstein
found that the disclosure of conflicts leads to exaggeration by advisors and
little discounting by advisees.43 In fact, some advisees appear to trust a
discloser even more, reasoning that the disclosure itself is evidence of
trustworthiness.44 Even when advisees do not actually feel greater trust toward
a discloser, there is some evidence that advice recipients feel increased pressure
to comply with advice that is accompanied by a disclosure because they feel
―insinuation anxiety.‖45 The idea is that when one receives advice, and then a
sheepish disclosure of a conflict along with reassurance that the underlying
belief in the advice is true, the advisee is put in an odd position. Rejection of
the recommendation may convey to the advisor that the advisee is suspicious
of his motives or worries that he has been corrupted.46 Or, even more
basically, advisees may feel obligated to help the advisor out—choosing against
the advisor‘s interest may feel rude.47 Couched in the terms of this Article, this
means that advisees fail to protect themselves when they are worried that
doing so is offensive. The analogy to the contracts context puts promisees in
the advisee position. Taking precautions against a promisor may be
uncomfortable or even counter-productive, because doing so communicates a
lack of trust.
1.4

Contract as Reference Point

In this paper, we accept both the economic and the interpersonal costs of
precaution-taking, but suggest that the timing of the precaution-taking
opportunity (before or after formation) affects decision-making even holding
these costs constant. The idea that contract formation is a reference point for
judgment is one that has had some traction in other areas of contract
scholarship. Daniel Kahneman and his co-authors argued that to evaluate the
fairness of a set of contract terms (described not as a contract but as ―actions
in which a firm sets the terms of future exchanges‖), individuals look to the
Daylian Cain, George Loewenstein & Don Moore The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse
Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest 34 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (2005); Daylian Cain, George
Loewenstein & Don Moore, When Sunlight Fails to Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 37 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 836 (2011).
44 See Daylian Cain, George Loewenstein & Don Moore The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse
Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest 34 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 5-6 (2005) (―Indeed, it is even possible
that disclosure could sometimes increase rather than decrease trust, especially if the person
with the conflict of interest is the one who issues the disclosure.‖).
45 Sunita Sah, George Loewenstein, and Daylian Cain. The Burden of Disclosure: Increased
Compliance with Disinterested Advice, Working Paper, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1615025 (last visited Jan. 8, 2012).
46 See id. at 6 (―Under these circumstances, disclosure effectively puts the advisees in a
bind; they distrust the advice but also feel pressured to comply with it.‖).
47 Id.
43
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reference transaction -- any exchange that sets a salient precedent for the one
being assessed. 48 This has important implications for what kinds of contractual
behavior people find acceptable. Kahneman and others found, for example,
that individuals deem lowering employee wages in the face of increased labor
supply unfair, since the employee‘s current wage serves as the reference
transaction against which wage adjustments are measured.49 But individuals
perceive hiring new employees at a lower wage as largely unproblematic,
because those employees are not party to the reference transaction between
the old employees and the firm.50 The idea of the reference transaction is that
the contract terms become a reference point that in turn frames parties‘
perceptions of their obligations and vulnerabilities in an exchange.51
Oliver Hart and John Moore recently applied this observation to contracts
even more explicitly, arguing that contracts are reference points which define
how parties evaluate outcomes.52 In a set of behavioral experiments, Ernst
Fehr, Oliver Hart, and Christian Zehnder found that contracts that build in an
otherwise efficient level of flexibility may have the effect of disappointing
expectations and overall reducing profits.53 Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder allowed
players in an experimental game to choose either a flexible contract or a rigid
contract.54 Players did not know what the state of the world would be at the
time of trading—that is, they did not know what the market value of the
traded good would be.55 The flexible contract permitted many different
outcomes, based on the buyer‘s choice once she learned the market rate.56 The
rigid contract permitted a single outcome, also determined by the buyer,
decided at the moment of drafting.57
Sellers had the option of ―shading,‖ or paying a small amount to reduce
the buyer‘s profit.58 We can think of this as the seller‘s opportunity to punish
the buyer for bad behavior. Sellers who got very little of the joint surplus when
48 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729 (1986).
49 Id. at 729-730.
50 See id. at 730 (―For new transactions, prevailing competitive prices or wages provide the
natural reference.‖).
51 Id. at 729.
52 Fehr, Hart, & Zehnder, supra note 6.
53 See id. at 4 (―A flexible contract as the advantage that parties can adjust the outcome to
the state of the world, but the disadvantage that any outcome selected will typically cause at
least one party to feel aggrieved and shortchanged, which leads to a loss of surplus from
shading.‖).
54 Id. at 6.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 10-11.
57 Fehr, Hart, & Zehnder, supra note 9 at 10-11.
58 Id. at 9.
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the contract was rigid very rarely engaged in shading.59 Sellers who got the
same kind of deal when the contract was flexible were significantly more likely
to shade (another way of saying that they engaged in a form of costly
punishment).60 Notice that sellers did not punish buyers for offering the
original bad deal; they only punished buyers for the bad deal when the contract
appeared to allow for a good deal. The reference point was the contract,
meaning the value of performance was judged with reference not to the overall
outcome, but with reference to the expected outcome under the contract.61
2. Experimental Evidence of Precautions
The studies reported below draw on each of the literatures reviewed in
Part 1. In line with the reference point theory, we predict that people will treat
precaution-taking decisions differently when they are in a contract already
rather than when they are still negotiating. In real life, one reason for this may
be drawn from the social psychology literature: people are less willing to be
self-interested within the context of the contract relationship, because they do
not want to offend the other party.62 Here, the scenarios we use are designed
to exclude actual costs that might come from relational harms caused by the
precautions. Furthermore, we predict that parties will evaluate both the
psychological and the financial appeal of precautions in light of the existence,
or not, of the contract.
In this section, we investigate the hypothesis that the perceived costs of
precautions are evaluated differently based on whether parties are in precontractual negotiations or parties are in a contractual commitment.
2.1

Study 1

2.1.1

Method

This experiment tested the hypothesis that subjects would be more likely
to request a liquidated damages clause, a fairly common form of the
contractual precaution,63 in the negotiation phase of contracting rather than
after the contract had been signed. We showed subjects one of two versions of
a contract scenario. In one version, they were asked to imagine that they were
Id. at 11-12.
Id. at 17.
61 Fehr, Hart, & Zehnder, supra note 9 at 1-3; see also Teichman, Feldman and Schurr, supra
note 6 (finding similar results in experiments focusing on parties' interpretation of their
contractual commitment).
62 See supra, note 49.
63 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 356, Comment a (1981) (explaining that a
liquidated damages clause can save parties time and money in the event of breach).
59
60
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still in the drafting stage; in the other, they had already signed the contract but
could add a rider to the contract. In each case, subjects are told that the basic
contract has already been worked out, and that they have received new
information that might encourage them to get additional guarantees. The only
difference between the scenarios is whether the basic exchange has been
formalized in a signed contract or not. Here is the first Study:
You need to hire help to move you out of your home. You approach Pack-n-Go
Corporation, a moving firm. The cost of the Pack-n-Go Total Moving Package is $3,000.
Two experienced movers and one trainee will be assigned to your job. Based on your
research, Pack-n-Go‘s prices are very competitive for the kind of move you are
contemplating.
Contract

No-Contract

After you have signed the contract, you start
to get some of your bigger items appraised.
This includes an old grand piano. You
thought the piano was worth $1,000 or so,
but it turns out it is worth almost $4,000. You
are somewhat worried about damage during
the move.

As you begin to negotiate the moving
contract, you start to get some of your bigger
items appraised. This includes an old grand
piano. You thought the piano was worth
$1,000 or so, but it turns out it is worth
almost $4,000. You are somewhat worried
about damage during the move.

How likely would you be to call the company
to negotiate for extra protection for the
piano? One option is to ask the moving
company to include a rider, a modification, to
your contract laying out the amount that the
movers will pay in the event of damage. How
likely are you to ask for this kind of clause to
be added to the agreement?

During the contract negotiations, how likely
would you be to negotiate for extra
protection for the piano? One option is to
ask the moving company to include a specific
provision in the contract laying out the
amount that the movers will pay in the event
of damage. How likely are you to ask for this
kind of clause during the negotiation?

2.1.2

Results

Subjects were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk. They were paid $.70
for answering a 5-minute survey. There were 209 subjects in the Contract
condition, and 201 in the No Contract condition. 60.1% of subjects were
female. Subject ages ranged from 18 to 88, with a median age of 29.
The hypothesis was that subjects would report that they were more willing
to ask for a liquidated damages clause in the No Contract condition than in the
Contract condition, and that prediction was reflected in the results. The
average interest in the clause in the no-contract group was 5.52 on a 7-point
scale where 7 was very likely; the mean for the Contract group was 5.00. This
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difference is highly significant (W=16864.5, p=.0004).64 Because it can be hard
to interpret the magnitude of the effect by looking only at the mean difference,
we also compared the subjects‘ interest in the clause in terms of percentages—
e.g., what proportion of subjects in each group thought they would be likely to
ask for the liquidated damages clause? We compared how many subjects said
that they would be likely to ask for the clause (a rating of 5, 6, or 7) or would
definitely ask for the clause by condition. 79% of subjects said they would be
likely to ask for the clause in the No Contract condition vs. 67% in the
Contract condition (W=18664, p=.011). Similarly, 25% of the No Contract
subjects reported that they would ―definitely‖ ask for a liquidated damages
clause, but only 19% said the same in the Contract condition (W=19385.5,
p=.062).
This study found support for the basic proposition that subjects were
more open to the idea of requesting a liquidated damages clause when the
contract was not yet finalized. The goal of these studies is to test the
hypothesis that people change their stance away from precaution-taking when
they enter a contract, even when there is no efficiency rationale for such a
behavioral shift. This initial study offers some preliminary evidence in support
of the hypothesis, but there are alternative explanations for the pattern of
responses which we would like to rule out in subsequent studies. We flag three
possibilities:




First, subjects may believe that the moving company would be more
willing to add the liquidated damages clause during the negotiation than
after, which could mean that the clause would be less costly if added
during negotiations (though the scenario was written to suggest that the
contract price is set), or simply that the other party would be more likely to
refuse the request.65
Second, it is conceivable that subjects could imagine that it is more costly

64 Non-parametric tests of statistical significance like the one used here (the Wilcoxon
test) are common when sample sizes are small, and when the distribution is non-normal. The
tests are typically less powerful but more robust than parametric tests like the t or F statistics.
One study reported here uses a small sample. For consistency, we report the p-values
generated by the non-parametric test in all three studies, noting that this is the more
conservative estimate of significance. See, e.g., ROBERT ROSENTHAL AND RALPH L. ROSNOW,
ESSENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 403 (McGraw Hill, 2006).
65 Subjects may even think that adding a rider is impermissible. Larry Cunningham has
noted that one of the most prevalent misconceptions about contracts is that they cannot be
modified. See Lawrence Cunningham, ―Popular Misconceptions About Contracts,‖ (July 22,
2011) available at http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/07/popularmisconceptions-about-contracts.html (summarizing the content of his forthcoming book,
CONTRACTS IN THE REAL WORLD: STORIES OF POPULAR CONTRACTS AND WHY THEY
MATTER (set for release in March 2012), and correcting the misconception that ―[c]ontracts
can‘t be changed once they are made‖).
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to get a rider to a contract than to negotiate the clause upfront—perhaps
because it means getting lawyers back in a room together or undergoing
some kind of additional formalization of the new term.66 The scenario is
not written to suggest that lawyers will be involved, or that the contract is
formal enough that adding the rider would require substantial extra effort,
but this reading is not implausible.
Finally, subjects may imagine that raising the precaution issue later in the
contract relationship is more offensive to the moving company, and that,
as such, they are more likely to shirk or retaliate in ways that could not be
adequately monitored or fully compensated.

Studies 2 and 3 were written to minimize the relevance of these
explanations for the proffered result by reimagining the role of precautiontaking in the promisor-promisee relationship. The kinds of precautions that
come to mind most readily are those that are made known to the promisor and
perhaps even affect his rights and obligations under the contract (like a
liquidated damages clause or a warranty clause in the contract), or at least the
logistics of performance. But many precautions need not affect the promisor
at all. A promisee might discreetly monitor a construction site when the crew
is gone for the night. They might discreetly leave a ―nanny-cam‖ on, to watch
a babysitter perform. Or take a contract home to read its terms carefully.
These are all self-protective maneuvers that happen outside the promisor‘s
awareness. Studies 2 and 3 invoke precautionary decisions that occur outside
the contract dealings, and are thus less likely to impose real costs, whether in
the transactions costs or the costs of dealing with an offended counterparty.
2.2

Study 2

2.2.1

Method

In Study 2, our hypothesis is that subjects will be more likely to buy a
warranty before purchase than after purchase (―purchase‖ here being the
moment of contractual agreement). This study was also conducted using
Amazon Turk participants, using the same subject pool as that in Study 1.
Subjects were shown one of two versions of an eBay transaction, and asked to
report whether they would be inclined to purchase an extra warranty, and how
much they would be willing to pay for it. In this case, the warranty is being
offered by a third party, such that subjects do not infer that the warranty offer
is a signal by the seller. Subjects in each condition were given identical
66 See Kevin E. Davis, The Demand for Immutable Contracts: Another Look at the Law and
Economics of Contract Modifications, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 487, 496 (2006) (suggesting that one
problem with creating incentives for renegotiation is that renegotiating incurs additional costs
while ―redistribut[ing], rather than creat[ing], value‖).
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information about the hypothetical seller. Finally, in the two conditions,
subjects are meant to understand that the underlying deal is a fait accompli. In
the Contract case, payment has already been submitted. In the other, subjects
are told that they have already made up their minds to buy the car, but that
payment has not been submitted. As in Study 1, the scenarios are designed to
make clear to subjects that in both cases, the underlying deal is going through
at a price that has already been set, and that the precaution is an add-on. In
this case, the add-on does not actually affect the contract, in the sense that it is
a separate deal with a third party. The scenario read as follows:
Please imagine that you are in the market to purchase a particular make and model of
used car: a 2003 Volkswagen Beetle, preferably in blue. Kelley Blue Book value of this car
in excellent condition is $8,900. You scour the local newspapers and online listings. You
have seen the car you want in a local lot for $11,000, but you think that is quite high. You
find one in ―excellent condition‖ (per the seller‘s report) on eBay. Here is what you know
about this seller:





This seller has a positive feedback score of 96.9%, with 132 ratings.
The seller has a 4.5 rating for ―Communication‖ and ―Shipping time‖ and a 4.3 rating
for ―Item as described.‖
The seller sells a variety of used goods; this seller is not primarily a car dealer
The most recent 3 comments in the ―Latest Feedback‖ screen for this seller are
―Perfect. Thanks!!!‖; ―Good price with free shipping‖; and ―Solid B+ seller.‖

The conditions provided:
Contract

No-Contract

You can buy the car now for $8,700. This
price seems reasonable to you, and you
decide to purchase the car. You sign the basic
agreement of sale, and arrange for delivery.
When you have submitted your payment, you
get an email from eBay about an eBay
insurance product. EBay sells a warranty that
you can purchase from them separately, up
until the day before delivery of the product.
The price varies depending on the product,
but the idea is that eBay will warranty the
product, guaranteeing you a full refund, no
questions asked, if you are unhappy upon
delivery. (The normal policy is that contested
returns go through an eBay dispute resolution
procedure.)

You can buy the car now for $8,700. This
price seems reasonable to you. You start
emailing with the seller to see if you can agree
on the details and arrange a sale.
While you are still working things out with
the seller and the sale is not final, you are
made aware of an eBay insurance product.
EBay sells a warranty that you can purchase
from them when you submit payment to the
seller. The price varies depending on the
product, but the idea is that eBay will
warranty the product, guaranteeing you a full
refund, no questions asked, if you are
unhappy upon delivery. (The normal policy is
that contested returns go through an eBay
dispute resolution procedure.)

The seller has seemed reasonable so far, and
you have submitted payment for the car, but
you still have the choice to buy the warranty.

The seller seems reasonable so far, and you
have already made up your mind to buy the
car, but the sale is not final.
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In both the contract and the non-contract condition, buyers were then asked:
What is the likelihood that you would purchase the eBay warranty if it were priced at
$150?
What is the most you would pay for the eBay warranty at this point? (In dollars)

2.2.2

Results

In this case, the hypothesis was that subjects would report more interest in
the warranty, and a willingness to pay a higher price for it, in the No Contract
condition. Both predictions were borne out by the data. Subjects in the
Contract group reported a mean likelihood to purchase a warranty of 5.35 on a
seven-point scale, compared to a mean of 5.67 in the No Contract group
(W=18504.5, p=.030). As in Study 1, we also parsed this data by looking at the
increased proportion of subjects reporting that they would either likely or
definitely purchase the warranty. In this case, 34% of subjects in the Contract
group and 44% of subjects in the No Contract group said they would
definitely buy the warranty (W=18839.5, p=.033). A similar trend, though not
significant, emerges by comparing whether subjects are likely (a rating of 5 to
7) to buy the warranty or not: 77% are likely in the Contract condition, and
82.5% are likely in the No Contract condition (W=19838, p=.162).
The willingness to pay question also differed significantly. Subjects in the
Contract group were willing to pay $175.53 on average for the warranty, but
subjects in the No Contract group would pay up to an average of $196.07.
This is also a statistically significant difference, one-tailed (W=18885, p=.015).
Overall, subjects found the warranty more attractive before they had
finalized the deal than after, even reporting that they would pay more for it ex
ante than ex post. In Study 1, a number of mechanisms were posited for why
parties might be more willing to request a liquidated damages clause during
negotiations rather than after. Here, many of those explanations are
inapplicable, because the main transaction is separate from the warranty
purchase. The price of the warranty is not different across conditions, nor is it
more or less of a hassle to purchase. And, since the warranty seller is not the
car seller, the warranty can be purchased without any signals about the primary
contract.
However, these results are plausibly subject to one additional alternative
explanation that is particularly hard to eliminate in the contract context. The
issue is this: subjects who read that they have signed the contract may believe
that they only would have signed the contract if they were very confident
about the other party‘s likelihood to perform. Although there is no content to
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the contract descriptions to support this inference, it tracks real-world
experience. We trust people we are in contracts with more than those we
aren‘t, believing we chose our contracts counterparties precisely because we found
them trustworthy. Study 3 is designed to make the moment of contracting appear
essentially arbitrary.
2.3

Study 3

2.3.1

Method

This study tested subjects‘ sensitivity to the isolated fact of being party to a
contract on the decision to ―shop around‖ for better terms. One of the goals
of this study was to narrow the distinction between Contract and No Contract
until it was no longer plausibly relevant to precautions decisions. Subjects in
the Contract group read that their car purchase contract could be cancelled,
with no penalty, within three days of purchase. Subjects in the No Contract
group read that their contract had been signed, but would not go into effect
for three days, and they could opt out until then. This description was
intended to make the notion of contract as meaningless as possible. Thus, in
both cases, doing nothing leads to contract, and returning the car within three
days of purchase cancels the contract and has no other legal repercussions.
Thirty female and thirty-one male incoming Temple law students
responded to a voluntary ten minute questionnaire about contracts. They were
not compensated. Subjects were randomly assigned to see all items in the
Contract or No Contract condition. The scenario read as follows:
Please imagine that you are in the market to lease a new car, a Chevy Blazer. You find the
car you want for the reasonable price of $300 per month at Tim‘s Auto World.

The conditions read:
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Contract

Non-Contract

You go to the dealership and sign the standard
lease contract, which includes a three-day return
clause—if you don‘t want the car, you can return
it, no questions asked, during the first three days.
In other words, your lease is under contract, but
you have three days to cancel with no legal or
financial consequences. You take the car home.

You go to the dealership and Tim tells you that
you can take the car home and use it for three
days. If you like it, you just keep it, and the
standard contract goes into effect. In other
words, your lease is not under contract, but the
standard lease agreement will kick in in three
days if you do not bring the car back. You take
the car home.

Remember: You are under a contract, but you
can
walk
away
without
consequence.
On your second day with the new car, you see an
ad in the paper from Discount Car Universe:
―Chevy Blazers Leased at Deep Discount!‖ with
a number to call for more information.

Remember: You are not under contract.
On your second day with the new car, you see
an ad in the paper from Discount Car Universe:
―Chevy Blazers Leased at Deep Discount!‖
with a number to call for more information.

We included three dependent variables. Wording of the questions did not
differ across conditions. Likelihood questions were answered on a Likert scale
where 1 was ―very unlikely,‖ 4 was ―neutral,‖ and 7 was ―very likely.‖
1. What is the likelihood you would call Discount Car Universe?
2. Now please imagine that newspaper ad lists the lease price for the same make and
model of the car you have from Tim‘s. They are leasing the same new Chevy Blazer
that you have for $265/month. What is the likelihood that you would decide to
return the car you have to Tim‘s and go with the Discount Car Universe option?
3.
Imagine that they have the same new Chevy Blazer. What is the highest
monthly rate at which you would decide to return the car you have to Tim‘s and go
with the Discount Car Universe option?

2.3.2

Results

Data from sixty total subjects was analyzed; twenty-nine in the Contract
condition and thirty-one in the No-Contract condition. One subject was
omitted from the analysis for failure to follow instructions.

Call to learn
discount

Contract

No Contract

5.34

6.03
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Return for $35
savings

5.52*

6.13*

Price to switch
dealers

$267.69*

$284.45*

*p<.05
The Call variable is not significant by itself (W=385.5, p=.323), but both
Return (W=290.5, p=.014) and Price (W=282.5, p=.013) differ significantly
across conditions. The Call and Return variables were also combined to test
the overall willingness to shop around. The total shop around ―score‖ is
significantly different between groups (W=310.5, p=.0368).
These results suggest that the Contract/No Contract effect persists even
when the Contract/No Contract distinction is unrelated to selection. We
discuss the implications of this series of experiments below.
3. Implications for the Psychology of Contract
Taken together, these studies provide evidence that across a range of
precaution types, people report that they would be less willing to protect their
interests vis à vis a contractual counterparty once in a contract. They are less
willing to include a liquidated damages clause, less willing to purchase a
warranty, and less willing to investigate other options when they are already
party to the contract, even when the formalization of the contract is essentially
arbitrary and without legal consequence.
In this part, we explore several psychological mechanisms that plausibly
explain these results. We divide these explanations into two groupings. The
first is a prospect theory explanation, which posits that the moment of
contracting establishes a reference point that frames how parties value the
costs and benefits of self-protective behavior.67 A prospect theory explanation
focuses on the different mental accounting parties engage in when deciding
whether to increase the contract price by adding the cost of a precaution or to
incur a separate loss by purchasing a precaution after the contract has been
signed.
The second explanation is less straightforward. We draw on existing
cognitive and behavioral psychology research to argue that the mere fact of
being contractually bound affects parties‘ attitudes toward one another. They
67

See Hart & Moore supra, note 9 at 2.
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are wary and adversarial in the pre-contract vetting. Once they have entered
the contract, they are trusting and cooperative—even when the moment of
formation is essentially meaningless. People may follow this algorithm because
it is a good rule of thumb. They may also be particularly trusting in contracts
because they are motivated to trust, as it does not feel good to be contractually
bound to an untrustworthy counterparty.
We note at the outset that the three studies reported above cannot
distinguish between the explanations we are positing here. The following
section considers both explanations, and discusses them in light of current
controversies in contract doctrine and policy.
3.1

Prospect Theory

The idea of contracts as reference points is substantially motivated by the
tenets of prospect theory, the overarching theory of experienced utility that
explains phenomena like the status quo bias and the endowment effect.
Prospect theory says that people evaluate outcomes by comparing them to a
reference point: they weigh losses more heavily than gains, and they are riskaverse in the domain of gains but risk-seeking in the domain of losses.68 The
reference point is the kink in the value function, the state of the world to
which any outcome is compared. Prospect Theory suggests that people code
the cost of vigilance in its various forms (shopping around, buying warranties,
etc.) around reference points.69 This has several effects on how people may
judge the value of precautions, based on how they understand the status quo
and how they mentally bundle the costs and benefits of self-protection.70
3.1.1

Mental Accounting

Because the marginal utility of gains is declining, and the marginal disutility
of losses is declining,71 people have preferences for how to account for
multiple gains and losses. In short, utility is maximized when gains are
segregated (lots of small gains are better than one big gain) and losses are
integrated (one big loss is better than lots of small losses).72 In this same vein,
and also relevant to our results, when people have a ―mixed gain‖—which is to
See Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115,
1118 (2003).
69 See id. (explaining that people ―evaluate decision options‖ in relation to a reference
point that represents the ―status quo‖).
70 See id. at 1115 (suggesting that Prospect Theory allows theorists to understand how
people evaluate whether or not to take precautions based on perceived consequences).
71 See Alan Schwartz et al., Prospect Theory, Reference Points, and Health Decisions, 3 JUDGMENT
AND DECISION MAKING 174, 176 fig. 1 (2008) (depicting the Prospect Theory value function).
72 Richard Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI. 199 (1985).
68
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say, a mixture of gains and losses that results in a net gain—they prefer
integration to segregation.73 This is a fairly simple explanation for why we
might see people opting to add a warranty into the contract price when they
would never be willing to pay for the warranty if they were contacted about it
two days after the initial product purchase. In the pre-contract case,
purchasing the precaution means raising the contract price. In Study 2,
subjects willing to pay $150 for the warranty pre-contract might think that they
are going from a loss of $8700 to $8850. Once the contract is signed, the
reference point is re-set, and the warranty means moving from a cost of $0 to
a cost of $150. The analysis holds up if we think of the contract as a mixed
gain.74 Because losses loom larger than gains, a smaller gain is preferable to a
bigger gain plus a separate loss.
3.1.2

Status Quo Bias

The status quo bias describes an individual‘s preference for the current
state of the world, even in the face of evidence that a particular change has a
high probability of yielding net benefits.75 The status quo bias is related to the
endowment effect: people who are endowed with a good value it more highly
than those who are not endowed with it, even when the initial endowment is
randomly assigned.76 Because potential losses loom larger than potential gains,
those faced with the possibility of making a switch underestimate the utility of
new benefits and overestimate the disutility of losing currently-valued
attributes.77
Favoring the status quo is often quite rational.78 Sometimes the status quo
Id. at 202.
In terms of utility, contracts are almost certainly mixed gains, because typically people
are getting something that they want more than they want the money. See David Friedman,
LAW‘S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 18-19
(Princeton U. Press 2001) (explaining that based on rational-choice theory, economic legal
analysis understands the way a contracting party values a given exchanged based on her
willingness to enter into the transaction). However, the mixed gain analysis is not necessarily a
perfect fit here because people may not think of their own benefit in monetary terms.
75 See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227,
1228-29 (2003) (defining the ―status quo bias‖).
76 See id. at 1229 (explaining that the status quo bias leads to the ―offer-asking gap,‖ in
which people require a higher price to sell a good than they would offer to purchase the same
good).
77 For classic demonstrations of how the status quo bias may in general motivate
contracting parties to prefer preexisting form terms, see Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference
in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1583 (1998); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 608 (1998).
78 See Korobkin, The Endowment Effect supra, note 79 at 1280 (―[T]he endowment effect
is not obviously ―irrational‖ behavior: a preference for what one has over what one does not
73
74
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has been well-researched and carefully chosen, invested in over time, and
thoroughly vetted. It deserves to be favored. But the status quo bias research
says that people favor the status quo even when none of the above apply.79
Even if experimenters just randomly assign one option as the status quo, and
inform participants that the ‗status quo‘ designation is random, participants are
still more reluctant to make a different choice.80 Switching feels different than
choosing. This is the prospect theory explanation for the results of Study 3.
The status quo in the no-contract condition is just that—no contract, no car
lease. Switching when that is the case is more attractive than when the car is
under lease, even when cancellation is permitted.
In all, the implications of prospect theory for precautions are fairly
straightforward. Individuals deem the precaution less valuable, or more costly,
if they have already signed the contract. This has consequences for some realworld contracts dilemmas. For example, in the insurance context, a number of
commentators have expressed surprise that people are willing to purchase
extended warranties for consumer goods, goods that almost no one would
insure under any other circumstances.81 At least in part, there is a mental
accounting explanation for this. Before the purchase is final, when the sales
clerk offers the warranty, the protection is rolled into the contract price. Once
the item is purchased, though, any additional insurance is an extra loss.
Similarly, consumers often find themselves renewing contracts that they would
never choose all else being equal—they are biased toward the status quo.
Prospect theory is a plausible explanation for our findings that parties take
a different attitude toward precautions before and after finalizing a contract,
assuming that the subjective experience of formation is the relevant reference
transaction. First, when a costly precaution is included in the total contract
price, the loss is coded as less severe than it is when the loss is a separate hit
that comes after the contract price, because of the declining marginal disutility
of losses. Second, sometimes the wise precaution for a party to take is to seek
a different counterparty. The status quo bias predicts that people will be
reluctant to do so if they consider the current counterparty a done deal.
3.2

Relational Contracting and Overtrust

have, or for what one is accustomed to compared to the unknown, is no more troublesome
than a preference for chocolate ice cream over vanilla.‖).
79 See Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias, supra, note 81 at 624 (explaining that rational-choice
theory cannot account for the status quo bias).
80 Id. at 626.
81 See, e.g., Tao Chen et al., Why do Consumers Buy Extended Service Contracts?, 36 J. OF
CONSUMER RESEARCH 611, 611 (2009) (―Although most consumer magazines and experts
advocate consumers not buy ESCs because they provide little value, it is intriguing that the
demand for ESCs remains high.‖).
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Our alternate (and possibly complementary) explanation for the
differential precautions approaches before and after contracting is that people
take a different stance, both interpersonally and cognitively, toward a potential
counterparty who is being vetted than toward a contract partner. Negotiating
is adversarial, but performing is cooperative. There are two possible reasons
for this, the first of which is deliberate and rational and the second of which is
implicit and intuitive.
Of course parties may reasonably believe that once the contract is signed,
trusting is simply more efficient. Even commercial actors sometimes prefer to
structure their business agreements informally, with an implicit or explicit
reliance on personal moral commitments and community norms rather than
formal legal sanctions. Stewart Macaulay brought this to light in his analysis of
real-world contracting between Wisconsin businessmen in the 1960s, noting
that many of them exchanged formal written contracts but ignored them.82
David Charny followed up on this research with a systematic analysis of the
benefits of nonlegal sanctions. Charny argued that in many cases, commercial
actors may be rational to depend on social and psychic harms to deter promise
breaking.83 And, as described in Part II, people may realize that there are social
norms around interpersonal trust in contract that are not worth violating
because they will hinder the relationship, inducing shirking or retaliation on the
part of the counterparty.84 Which is all to say that sometimes parties
intentionally ground their mutual obligations in promissory morality. This
explanation is entirely sensible and quite relevant to many contracts
relationships, but it is one that we will set to the side at this point.85 People
may have rational preferences for trusting their counterparties in some cases,
but we think in many cases this is neither a robust preference nor a helpful
stance. You might want to let down your guard with your credit card company,
but it is probably unwise to do so.
Rather, the norm of interpersonal trust in contracts may operate in some
cases as a rule of thumb. The rule works very well for interpersonal promises,
works pretty well for long-term negotiated agreements (employment, for
example), and works quite poorly for contracts of adhesion between
consumers and firms. The idea of a rule of thumb for interpersonal trust in
contract is related to existing research on the commonsense approach to
Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55 (1963).
83 David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373
(1990).
84 See supra, notes 48-50.
85 For a more in-depth look at promissory morality, see Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann
O'Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L.REV. 1717, 1755-56 (2006) (discussing
contract law's role in promoting optimal trust).
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contract and promise. This research argues that people use the idea of promise
in a kind of heuristic sense, assuming that their legal obligation tracks their
understanding of the moral obligation entailed in promise.86 They assume that
specific performance is a typical remedy, believe that willful breachers should
be punished more harshly than unfortunate breachers, and experience the
harm of breach as a harm of betrayal—in other words, they evaluate breach of
contract along the same dimensions as promise-breaking.87 Our intuition is
that for those who reflexively think about contracts in terms of ordinary
promissory morality, the fact of being in a contractual relationship comes with
an assumption that interpersonal trust is the appropriate norm.
It is also possible that people are not just mindlessly adhering to a trust-incontract heuristic, but that they are motivated to be trusting because they would
feel so foolish for having chosen an untrustworthy counterparty. People may
not want to check up on a current contract partner because doing so may
reveal that the initial assessment or choice of counterparty was flawed.
Cognitive dissonance is a psychological phenomenon that describes this
tendency to reconcile discrepancies between beliefs and past choices by
adjusting the beliefs.88 People make many decisions for reasons that are not in
line with beliefs. In the contracts context, we might sign a credit card contract
because the salesperson is particularly charming or aggressive or re-order a
low-value good (say, a newspaper subscription) because we forget to opt out.
These are not particularly compelling reasons for contracts, and may cause
some amount of cognitive tension as the consumers hold two dissonant
beliefs. For example: I do not like this credit card company; I am contractually
bound to this credit card company. Cognitive dissonance theory says that
people will often reduce that tension by changing the belief (this contract is
desirable), since the action is already past.89
People who have opted into a relationship or a purchase will avoid or
misremember information that suggests they made the wrong choice. For
See generally Kevin M. Teevin, Origins and Scope of the American Moral Obligation Principle, 46
Clev. St. L. Rev. 585 (1998) (describing the history of moral obligations in contract law from
the eighteenth through twentieth centuries).
87 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of
Contract, 6 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 405, 423 (2009)
88 See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
89 See Yuval Feldman and Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?
100 GEO. L. J. 5, 26-27 (2011) (hypothesizing that "the process of contracting, so long as it is
the outcome of free choice, could lead to a deeper commitment to the contracts' terms.");
Stephanie Stern, Temporal Dynamics of Disclosure: The Example of Residential Real Estate
Conveyancing, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 57, 86 (arguing that late disclosures in real estate contracts
will be ignored because buyers are invested in the deal going forward); Shmuel I. Becher,
Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 117, 132 (2007)
(individuals less likely to take care with terms after they have decided to enter a contract).
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example, people who have just bought a new car are more likely to notice
advertisements whose content supports their purchase decision.90 Even more
interesting from our perspective is a study of mutual fund investors. Mutual
fund investment by non-professionals is characterized by a high level of
inertia; investors stay with poorly performing funds even when there is no
economic justification for doing so.91 This means that many investors are faced
with the kind of dissonance we have described above: I have chosen to stick
with this fund for many years when I could have chosen to sell it; this fund has
done poorly for many years.92 William Goetzmann and Nadav Peles sent
mutual fund investors a questionnaire about the mutual funds they used and
how the funds had performed in the past.93 Respondents explicitly reported
that they would not continue to hold a poorly performing fund for a long
time.94 They did not hold a belief that justified their decisions to hold what the
authors described as ―an unusually high frequency of poorly performing
funds.‖95 However, investors drastically overestimated the returns of funds
they had chosen themselves.96 They selectively remembered data points that
affirmed their choices.
Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that people engage in selective search
for information. This is similar to the theory of confirmation bias, which
suggests that people who are trying to evaluate a hypothesis are more likely to
look for information that supports the hypothesis than to search for
potentially falsifying evidence.97 People do not look for information that will
disconfirm a belief (e.g., I have signed on with the right counterparty), and that
in fact they do not want such information. This may explain the choice not to
monitor and not to shop around. And, of course, the choice to purchase a
precaution may itself be a source of tension. It means holding two dissonant
beliefs—I have already chosen this partner; I do not trust this partner.
3.3

Next Steps in the Psychology of Precautions

We have begun to sketch a picture of the kink in decision-making at the
moment of contracting, and we have reviewed literature that may help explain
the phenomenon. However, this paper cannot distinguish between the
90 See Danuta Erlich, Isaiah Guttman, Peter Schonbach and Judson Mills, Post-Decision
Exposure to Relevant Information, 54 J. AB. SOC. PYSCH. 98 (1957).
91 See William Goetzmann & Nadav Peles, Cognitive Dissonance and Mutual Fund Investors, 20
J. FIN. RESEARCH 145, 145 (1997).
92 Id. at 147.
93 Id. at 147-150.
94 Id. at 148-149.
95 Id. at 145.
96 Goetzmann & Peles supra, note 95 at 149.
97 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 Rev.
Gen. Psychol. 175, 177 (1998).
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explanations we have offered (prospect theory and overtrust), nor can we rule
out other explanations. This is a real problem for understanding which
contexts are most relevant to this finding. Prospect theory is a powerful
foundation for precautions that require extra payment, or where there is a
status quo bias at issue, but the overtrust explanation seems more compelling
as an explanation for why consumers do not read late-arriving riders to their
contracts. Identifying the psychological mechanism, or mechanisms, that
explain our results is the next step in this research.
Our argument also elides the important observation that people feel
differently about different kinds of contracts.98 Our psychological response to
contracts of adhesion is and should be different than the psychology of longterm deals with well-liked business partners. Recent research suggests that
people are held responsible for the moral commitment of contract in ways that
corporations are not.99 And form contracts may be perceived as generally less
fair and less enforceable than other contracts.100 Even without empirical
support, it seems reasonable to predict that consumers signing form contracts
with large companies will show a smaller effect of contract than those in
agreements with other individuals. We predict that this is a moderator of the
effect we have demonstrated, and we hope to test this prediction empirically in
future work.
Finally, one of the most interesting questions raised but not addressed in
this research is the question of when people think they are in contracts. In the
studies reported above, subjects were told in plain language that a contract
period had or had not begun. We have speculated, though, that the moment of
contracting may be subject to manipulation.101 Even when a court would find
that the contract was not finalized, for example, consumers who have signed
their name to something, or executed the primary exchange, may understand
98 We recognize that precautionary behavior is likely to be different depending on the kind
of contract that parties are in. This Article is about the broad class of contracts that individual
non-merchants might be party to, including negotiated agreements like home renovation
contracts, and consumer contracts of adhesion like cell phone contracts. We intentionally
exclude employment contracts, although doctrinal questions surrounding formation and
following terms abound in that area of law. That is, we argue that individuals generally behave
differently whether or not the contract has begun, but we realize that the effect of contract
may be moderated by the kind of contract.
99 Uriel Haran, A Person-Organization Discontinuity in Contract Perception: Why Organizations
Can
Get
Away
With
Breaking
Contracts
But
Individuals
Cannot,
http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/HaranContractBreach.pdf.
100 Zev Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizenship, Rule of Law, and
Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2008).
101 Cf. Robert A. Hillman and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic
Age, 77 NYU L. REV. 429, 476-482 (2002) (discussing ways in which firms could encourage
consumers to fail to read their contracts online).
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themselves to be in a contract.102 In fact, we might even worry that a
salesperson may push for an oral agreement, and then present the written
contract as an apparent afterthought. This is precisely the scenario that makes
policymakers especially nervous in contexts like subprime mortgage lending.103
One of the contributions of psychological research may be to pin down the
factors that lead consumers to consider a deal finalized.
4. Discussion
Given the basic phenomenon that emerges from the studies here, there are
some initial points to make about the doctrinal implications of our findings.
That the moment of contracting is special isn‘t exactly earth-shattering.
Indeed, the first-year contracts class is built around the instant when two
minds meet and agree to do business with one another. Our experiments
suggest, however, that this moment produces a behavioral kink, divorced from
concerns about cost, or projection of future legal remedies. What is the
practical upshot of the research that we have undertaken?
4.1

Reimagining Precautions

This paper seeks to expand the category of precautions to include selfinterested or self-protective behavior more generally. In our view, the literature
on ―precautions‖ focuses too narrowly on those precautions which parties may
take after they have entered into the contract, and which protect against
breach. But there are many steps that ordinary consumers can take to protect
themselves, not simply against breach of their contracts, but from exploitative
or undesirable behavior by their counterparty. Such behaviors, which
maximize gains from the contracting relationship, are precautionary, and we
posit will be subject to a similar psychic calculus as the precautions against
breach that our experiments directly targeted.
For example, reading a contract carefully is a precaution.104 Hidden terms
See, e.g., Anthony M. Balloon, From Wax Seals to Hypertext: Electronic Signatures, Contract
Formation, and a New Model for Consumer Protection in Internet Transactions, 50 EMORY L.J. 905, 934
(2001) (―That a signature is the central formality in contract formation-particularly in a
consumer transaction cannot be overstated. Most consumers equate their signature with being
bound to the terms of an agreement.‖ (footnotes omitted)).
103 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2043-2045 (2007) (including in its definition of
predatory lending non-fraudulent forms of non-transparency between brokers or lenders and
consumers).
104 This is not, of course, a new insight. See, e.g., Erin Ann O'Hara, Choice of Law for Internet
Transactions: The Uneasy Case for Online Consumer Protection, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1883, 1925 (2005)
(exploring social and psychological forces that reduce the likelihood that consumers will
protect themselves by reading their agreements).
102
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are not always unenforceable, even if the promisee and court agree that they
are unfairly surprising. But when a credit card company exploits a hidden term
in the contract to raise a cardholder‘s interest rates, or deny class certification,
it harms the cardholder in ways that the cardholder did not intend to be
vulnerable to. Another example of a common precaution is hiring a lawyer.
Ordinary people involved in higher-stakes deals (home purchases, for
example) take this precaution—not only to protect against the possibility that
the seller will breach, but to ensure that the contract itself protects the buyer‘s
interests.105 And, of course, one of the most important ways that consumers
protect themselves is by shopping around. Comparing terms and prices and
selecting good deals are the primary means by which consumers can influence
the terms of form contracts.106
Construed broadly, precautions matter for ordinary consumers, and this
has implications for analysis of precautions. First of all, it means that the scope
of the issue is big: it involves almost all contracts, not just negotiated
agreements between sophisticated players. Second, it means that economic
analyses are less likely to accurately predict precautionary behavior, because
ordinary citizens are more likely than commercial or institutional actors to
deviate from the rational actor model in noticeable, systematic ways. This
approach to defining contractual self-protection motivates the focus here. We
ask when ordinary promisees—e.g., consumers—protect themselves against
deficient performance, and how cognitive biases may discourage optimal
precaution-taking even when economic analysis suggests that they ought to
protect themselves.
So re-imagined, the nexus of precautions (against breach and exploitation)
and psychic costs (both prospect theory and overtrust) has certain potential
doctrinal implications. We must be quick to emphasize the tentativeness of
our conclusions. Not only is our work subject to the ordinary caveats about
survey research, which we explore at length below, but we would need to
directly test whether in fact individuals' vigilance against breach and
exploitation are similarly kinked. If they are, and we think there is no obvious
theoretical reason that they would not be, we would further want to
understand how different kinds of contracts and contracting parties moderate
the effects we have seen. Still, there is a possibility that understanding
contractual vigilance as a reference point problem will have certain
transformative implications, which we now describe.
105 See Michael Braunstein, Structural Change and Intra-Professional Competitive Advantage: An
Example Drawn from Residential Real Estate Conveyances, 62 MO. L. REV. 241, 241 (1997) (noting
that lawyers were involved in 40% of residential real estate conveyances in 1997).
106 But cf. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts:
The Case of Software License Agreements, 5 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 447 (2008) (finding little
relationship between competition and consumer-friendly terms).
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Easy Cases: Good Faith and Modification

In some areas of doctrine, we think that re-emphasizing the moment of
contracting fits well with the current approach of courts and scholars. For
example, consider the doctrine of good faith. Loosely defined, opportunism is
selfishness and denial of the implicit duty one owes another to behave in ways
that are socially acceptable. As Erin O‘Hara O‘Connor observes, the antiopportunism good faith doctrine applies to parties in a contracting
relationship, but not to counterparties with whom deals are not yet concluded:
[C]ontracting parties are entitled to behave in a complete self-interested
fashion when they are choosing contracting partners and negotiating
contract terms. Once the relationship has been formed, however, the
parties are expected to treat the contract as a kind of partnership – the
relationship is supposed to benefit both parties, and performance or
termination which deprives one of the parties of the substantial value of
the contract is simply unacceptable.107
Good faith thus acts as a powerful check against the impulse to take
advantage of a counterparty. It punishes actions which are anti-social; denies
unreasonable or harmful exercises of contractual rights; and prohibits ―game
playing‖ with respect to contracting terms.108 But before the moment of
contracting, we are free to behave in exactly such socially outrageous ways.
Indeed, checks on exploitative behavior pre-contract are weak. Though
parties may not lie about facts, they may (generally) puff.109 Though sellers
may not exercise undue influence, that defense is famously almost impossible to
prove at trial.110 Duress prevents the most extreme examples of negotiation
pressure, but the far more common situation of a party benefiting from
another‘s economic necessity is generally perfectly legal.111 Overall, parties
failing to take precautions against exploitative behavior pre-contract are
unlikely to be protected by the law, while parties in a contract who are similarly
trusting are entitled to a measure of legally-funded insurance. In this way, the
law generally tracks our experimental findings about how laypeople perceive
Erin A. O‘Hara, Trustworthiness and Contract 17 (Gruter Inst. Project on Values & Free
Enter., 2007); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, cmt. C. That said, there are of
course strands of good faith doctrine written into the negotiation process. For example,
courts routinely will "fix" illusory contracts by implying some reasonable set of reciprocal
obligations into the parties‘ terms.
108 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 11.39 (2009).
109 David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395 (2006).
110 Kellye Y. Testy, An Ode to Odorizzi, excerpted in RANDY BARNETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 1003 (3d ed. 2003); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational
Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 14 (2004) (describing
undue influence and duress as "narrow" doctrines").
111 PERILLO, SUPRA N. 108, at 9.7 (discussing business compulsion).
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the importance of the moment of contracting.
By contrast, the modern approach to modification appears to badly match
the behavioral effects we have shown. Historically, the common law generally
viewed modifications to contracts with suspicion.112 Such changes generally
required new consideration (however slight).113 Where unforeseen
circumstances made performance of the existing agreement unusually difficult,
modifications which were fair and equitable could be enforceable.114 But such
circumstances rested on an increase in the promisor‘s cost, not the availability
of a benefit previously unanticipated.115 This treatment of modification made
some sense from a psychological perspective. By focusing only on increase in
the promisor‘s cost, as opposed to opportunity costs, the rule operates
asymmetrically, ―punishing‖ breaches to gain, and ―permitting‖ breaches
resulting from losses.116 This fits well with previous research suggesting that
individuals feel quite differently about these two scenarios.117
But, as we discussed in the Introduction, courts seem to be increasingly
unwilling to police modifications to consumer agreements.118 Commentators
bemoan the practice of imposing unilateral changes to common consumer
contracts without providing any corresponding benefit.119 Such unilateral
modifications are increasingly checked through viral campaigns–consider
Verizon‘s proposed $2.00 convenience fee for online credit card payment,120 or
Bank of America‘s $5.00 fee for debit card use.121 Both modifications were
Cf. United States v. Stump Home Specialties Mfg., 905 F.2d 1117 (7th Cir.
1990) (arguing that modifications ought not be policed by good faith or consideration
doctrines but rather unconscionability or duress).
113 The UCC disposes of the need for new consideration under 2-209(1), though of course
the Code‘s general requirement of good faith prevails.
114 PERILLO, SUPRA N. 108, at 4.9; Rest. 2nd. 89.
115 See, e.g., Brian Const. and Development Co., Inc. v. Brighenti, 405 A.2d 72 (1978)
(holding a contract modification binding where one party would have been forced to incur
unforeseen expenses under the initial contract).
116 See Aditi Bagchi, Managing Moral Risk: The Case of Contract, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1878,
1924 n.148 (2011).
117 Wilkinson-Ryan and Baron, supra n. 87.
118 See Horton, Shadow Terms, supra note 9, at 665-666; Bar-Gill and Davis, supra note 10, at
8-16 (providing evidence of scope of unilateral modification problem).
119 See Katherine J. K. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: The Role of
the Federal Trade Commission Act’s Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Net Neutrality Debate, 78
Fordham L. Rev. 641, 692-693 (2009) (explaining that many jurisdictions do not permit
unilateral contract modification in the absence of additional consideration).
120 ―Verizon Scraps $2.00 Fee,‖ CNN MONEY (Dec. 30, 2011), available at
money.cnn.com/2011/12/30/technology/verizon_fee_cancelled/index.htm.
121 Brady Dennis, ―Bank of America Faces Outrage of Debit Card Charge,‖ The
Washington
Post
(Sept.
30,
2011),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/bank-of-america-faces-outrage-over-debit-cardcharge/2011/09/30/gIQAp8zGAL_story.html.
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ultimately abandoned after substantial public pressure, not a court‘s decision.122
The real question is what is wrong with unilateral modifications to a
long-term consumer contract. One possibility is that such modifications are an
expression of inequality in bargaining power, imposed through adhesive
contracts without the possibility of change. Without disagreeing with that
premise, one might fairly question why modified terms ought to be treated
differently from those originally proposed in the deal. If we are to permit
consumers to enter into adhesion contracts with large firms with little
substantive regulation, why not similarly permit them to continue such
relationships as modified over time?
Our experiments suggest that internal to the contracting relationship,
promisees are unlikely to perceive new terms in the same adversarial light as
they might have before the contract was formed. This is particularly relevant to
more complex or less salient terms like arbitration clauses. We would predict
that in the contract, parties are less likely to read them, and having read them,
probably less likely to perceive the likelihood of opportunistic behavior by
their counterparties.
The precise mechanism for this effect remains unknown. Some have
argued that status quo bias seems to provide a sufficient reason standing alone
for parties to stand pat despite onerous proposed modifications.123 But we
tend to think that motivated cognition and overtrusting provides a more
powerful explanation.124 Because, as Alces and Greenfield argue, contracts
encourage relational investments,125 consumers may be caught flat-footed by
their counterparties‘ attempts to change the terms of the deal. In either event,
we agree with those commentators who suggest that courts should generally
treat modifications with heightened scrutiny.126
And yet, this general conclusion requires an important caveat. If a
modification is requested by an individual and is the subject of actual
negotiation, current doctrine‘s emphasis on a requirement of changed
circumstances seems overprotective. After all, our research suggests that inside
See CNN Money supra, note 127 (describing the online petition that caused Verizon to
revoke the proposed policy); Dennis supra, note 128 (noting dissatisfied customers‘ responses
to the proposal).
123 Eric A. Zacks, Unstacking The Deck? Contract Manipulation and Credit Card Accountability,
78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (2010); Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation,
and Contract Law, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
124 Of course, these are not actually competing explanations. See Becher, supra n. 89, at
138-140.
125 Alces and Greenfield, supra n. 11, at 1100.
126 See generally Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out? An Argument for Strict Scrutiny of
Individual Contracts, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 95 (2006) (arguing for more rigorous judicial standards
in evaluating ―rolling‖ contracts).
122
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of the relationship, precaution taking will be relatively rare. Modified bargains
initiated by laypeople should be understood by the law to be the result of a
special effort by one of the parties to recognize a breakdown in the
relationship, and an attempt to assert it on sounder footing. Even if such a
new relationship results from the increase in the opportunity cost of
performance, an individual‘s request for a modification of an executory
bargain should be permitted if it comports with the general obligation of good
faith. That is, we think that Uniform Commercial Code's approach to
modification127 can be a better fit with folk psychology than the common law‘s
pre-existing duty rule.
4.3

Harder Cases: Disclosure & Promissory Estoppel

4.3.1

Which Terms are in the Deal?

In modification cases, and indeed in the experiments that we present in
this Article, the moment of contracting is not in question. Parties either have
or have not signed on the dotted line, and that distinction affects their
behavior. However, in at least some cases, the deal proceeds in multiple
phases, and the moment that the law recognizes a meeting of the minds is not
the same as the moment that a consumer believes that the contract has begun.
For example: a seller offers to sell a computer, and a consumer buys it over the
phone. When the consumer opens the box at home, she finds onerous terms
in a contract included in the packaging. Will a court later include such terms in
the parties‘ agreement? Hill v. Gateway permitted such ―rolling contracts,‖
reasoning that the buyer surely knows more terms are coming, and can cancel
the contract by returning the computer.128
Hill implicates both prospect theory and trust explanations for the
consumers‘ apparently unwary behavior. Because the contract had already
been ―signed‖ by both parties,129 returning the product meant a shift from the
status quo—switching rather than choosing. And, because the contract period
had begun, consumers who trusted the counterparty would be less likely to
take the simplest precaution of reading the terms.
Hill has been immensely controversial. It famously misapplied the
Uniform Commercial Code, which would have likely thrown out the latearriving terms.130 But in discounting the value of pre-contract disclosure, it

127
128

See supra, note 121.
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); see also ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir.

1996)
In reality, the Hills agreed to a sale on the phone.
Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F.Supp.2d 1332 (D.Kan. 2000); PERILLO, SUPRA N. 108, at
2.12; U.C.C. 2-207
129
130
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sparked a debate that continues to the present day.131 That debate is essentially
about when promisees can be charged with failing to protect themselves
against bad terms. On the one side are the drafters of the American Law
Institute‘s new Principles of the Law of Software Contracts.132 Robert Hillman
and Maureen O‘Rourke, authors of the Principles, defended mandatory
disclosure before contracting against its many critics. Although acknowledging
that mandatory disclosure of terms can create costs, and that terms are unlikely
to be read by contracting parties, they argue that disclosure is necessary to
preserve the legitimacy of the state-run contract enforcement regime:
Standard forms constitute private legislation backed by the state‘s
enforcement processes, and the legitimacy of these forms also depends
on reasonable notice of content. In fact, adequate notice of terms
constitutes a foundation for much of contract doctrine, including rules
of interpretation (such as interpreting terms against the drafter), the
parol evidence rule, and, of course, the general rules of formation.133
Hillman and O‘Rourke also argue that disclosure can spark third-party
monitoring, which could, in some cases, improve the content of standard form
terms.134 Others have defended disclosure when paired with substantive
regulation of the architecture in which the information is presented.135 But
many authors have argued, to the contrary, that disclosure is ineffective in
policing terms.136 There is substantial empirical research showing that
consumers do not read terms of standard form contracts before they agree to
them,137 and what they read they do not understand.138 Thus, mandated
For a summary, see Robert Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORD. L. REV. 743 (2002).
ALI, Principles of the Law: Software Contracts (2010); Hillman and O‘Rourke,
Defending Disclosure, supra n. 15, at 106-108.
133 Id. at 106.
134 Id. at 107.
135 M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2012)
(arguing that changes in website design can make reading terms more likely).
136 See, e.g., Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra n. 14, at 647 ; Ben-Shahar, Myth, supra n. 14, at
13-21; Mann and Siebeneicher, supra n. 14, at 998-1001.
137 See Hillman and Rachlinski, supra n. 101, at 436 (―The consumer, engaging in a rough
but reasonable cost-benefit analysis of these factors, understands that the costs of reading,
interpreting, and comparing standard terms outweigh any benefits of doing so and therefore
chooses not to read the form carefully or even at all.‖); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler. Will
increased disclosure help? Evaluating the recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software
Contracts.” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165-186 (2011); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure
Matter? (NYU Center for Law, Economics and Organization Working Paper No 10-54, Nov
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1713860 (visited Jan. 4, 2012); Ben-Shahar and
Schneider, supra n. 14, at 671-72; Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a
Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 36-37 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Ctr. for
Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1443256 (same).
138 Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL‘Y
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132
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transparency provides an illusory form of regulation: it discourages more
substantive policing of terms while inundating consumers with information
that they cannot, and will not, process.
We suggest recasting this debate around the question of whether or not
consumers think that the contract has begun. Our results provide some
evidence that whether individuals are in a contract influences their selfprotective choices. They are more likely to behave in a self-interested way–to
protect against exploitation, to contract against breach, to select trustworthy
counterparties. But the subjective moment of contracting only sometimes
tracks when a court will find a contract to be found. Parties can intentionally,
or unintentionally, manipulate the negotiations to signal contractual agreement
in its absence, thus lowering the defenses of their counterparties.139
How might they do this? Well, one example comes from Hill itself. As
Judge Easterbrook argued, terms which follow can be appreciated at leisure,
rather than requiring a ―droning voice [providing contract terms that] would
anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential buyers . . . . Customers as a
group are better off when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as
telephonic recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return device.‖140
But of course this assumes that consumers are equally likely to protect
themselves before and after they understand themselves to be in the contract.
If, as we have argued, they are not, then Easterbrook‘s approach motivates
sellers to encourage the belief by buyers that a contract exists–whether or not
it does–and then send terms which would not have been agreed to in the first
instance.
Even courts that disagreed with Hill adopt its basic understanding of the
importance of legal, rather than subjective, formation. Klocek v. Gateway, which is
often paired with Hill in casebooks and treatises, rejects Judge Easterbrook‘s
conclusion that UCC 2-207 doesn‘t apply in the absence of two literal forms.141
But it apparently would have held that were there evidence from which one
could draw an inference of assent from the consumers‘ receipt of the good, 142
the subsequent terms would have been incorporated in the bargain.143 Both
courts assume that the psychological reaction to terms that follow ought to be
much like the reaction of terms that coincide with bargaining: caveat emptor.
But there is a danger in proceeding this way. A consumer who believes
REV. 233, 234, 237-38 (2002)
139 Cf. Calo, supra note 135, at 17; Ben-Shahar and Schneider, supra n. 14, at 154. See also
supra, note 108.
140 Hill v. Gateway, 105 F.3d at 1149.
141 104 F.Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
142 See generally PERILLO, SUPRA N. 108, at 2.18.
143 See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp.2d. 1332 (D.Kan. 2000); Rogers v. Dell, 38
P.3d 826 (Okla. 2005).
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herself to be in a contractual relationship may not protect herself in the same
way as a consumer who is still in negotiations. We should be especially
suspicious of terms when the subjective moment of contracting precedes the
objective moment, or when there is evidence that one party has encouraged
the other to believe that a contract is present when it isn‘t.
We will illustrate this problem with two additional examples: one a classic
chestnut, and one from the domain of electronic commerce.
Imagine that Oliver writes Alice, and promises to satisfy Alice‘s paper
needs for the coming year, the price to be fixed for the first three months, and
the parties thereafter to negotiate monthly on the price and quantity required,
with a cap at the market bulk standard.144 Alice agrees to this deal. After a
month, Oliver sends Alice a written ―confirmation,‖ which fixes prices for the
entire year.
Under traditional contract law principles, the first month of dealing
between Alice and Oliver is not a binding contract but rather an agreement to
agree, imposing no more than an obligation to negotiate in good faith about
future months.145 Only the following ―confirmation‖ provided the requisite
certainty to permit contractual enforcement. Or to put it differently, had
something gone wrong between the parties in that first month, neither likely
could seek contractual recovery. That is so even though Alice probably
believed herself to have entered into a morally binding commitment. The
agreement-to-agree doctrine thus may subject parties to the risk of exploitation
in a way which has not previously been appreciated. Promisees will overinvest
in such unenforceable bargains, even though the law provides no recourse at
all.
This can be expanded to electronic commerce as well. The traditional
distinction between browsewrap and clickwrap gains further substance with
our results in mind: browsewrap terms, which follow an agreement, are less
likely to be read than clickwrap terms, which (mildly) precede it. Courts are
more skeptical of browsewrap licenses, generally requiring terms to be
conspicuous, while they are generally accepting of clickwrap terms.146 If
consumers perceive themselves to have entered into a contract by clicking ―I
agree,‖ this distinction seems entirely warranted.147

These facts are, of course, loosely based on Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v.
Remington Paper & Power Co., 139 N.E. 470 (N.Y. 1923).
145 PERILLO, SUPRA N. 108, at 2.9(4)
146 See Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 836-848 (2007)
(summarizing difference between browsewrap and clickwrap cases).
147 A more conventional (but related) argument holds that consumers can be induced to
enter contracts online without even knowing that they are doing so, as the process lacks the
ordinary off-line formalities. Becher, supra n. 89, at 164-166.
144
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But what if they don‘t? After all, a consumer might fairly believe that they
have not entered into a contract until a piece of software has finished
downloading onto their machine, or when their payment is processed. Or they
might believe that the contract occurred when they first clicked on a product
to put it into their cart. The point is that the inquiry here isn‘t about when
notice happens with respect to the legal moment of contracting, but when
parties subjectively experience that contract as complete. That is an empirical
question, which further work could illuminate.
4.3.2

Promissory Estoppel

When should a disappointed plaintiff be able to bring a promissory estoppel
claim? The Restatement (Second) of Contracts requires the plaintiff to prove (1) the
existence of a promise; (2) that the promisor reasonably expected to induce
(and indeed did induce) action or forbearance; and (3) the presence of injustice
in the absence of enforcement.148 Scholars have questioned whether courts
should (and do) focus more on the first or second of these requirements. An
early set of empirical studies argued that courts focus on the nature of the
promise made, and ignored the promisee's reliance.149 Later work, led by Bob
Hillman, suggested that detrimental reliance drove courts; in its absence,
recovery was unlikely.150 The upshot is a doctrine which is highly controversial,
always threatening, but never quite, swallowing up the remains of contract
doctrine.151 We suggest that the law of promissory estoppel, like terms that
follow later, ought to be understood in light of the promisee‘s understanding
of the contract‘s legal effect. Promisees who believe that they are party to
enforceable contracts cannot be relied upon to protect themselves.
In a previous Article, we argued that promissory estoppel‘s continued
controversial nature might result from its distance from commonsense moral
understanding of what makes breach of contract feel immoral. We explained
that contractual breach could result in a feeling of being a ―sucker‖–one who
was the victim of an intentional and exploitative decision to betray a

148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
149 Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the
“Invisible Handshake”, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903 (1985); Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, The
Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 YALE L.J. 111 (1991).
150 Robert Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and
Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1998); cf. Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of
Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical Analysis Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 669, 701-02 (2010) (arguing that courts justify themselves in terms of both promise and
reliance).
151 See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory
Estoppel, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 52, 53 (1981) (―[PE] has become perhaps the most radical and
expansive development of this century in the law of promissory liability.‖); GRANT GILMORE,
THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 79 (1974).
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relationship.152 Promissory estoppel, by contrast, focuses generally on the
promisor‘s state of mind (her belief that the promise would or would not lead
to reliance),153 and does not require the betrayal of an agreement that inspired
trust.154 Thus, we concluded that ―promissory estoppel cases seem less likely
to contain plaintiffs who experienced the psychological feeling of being
suckered.‖155 A more realistic promissory estoppel doctrine would start with
the promisee‘s subjective understanding, asking if he subjectively believed the
promise was legally enforceable. Our results suggest how this approach,
apparent in some cases,156 could reorient doctrine toward those promisees who
were led to believe that they were in bargains, thus lowering their defenses to
exploitation.
The consequence of this changed orientation would be a doctrine that
focused on the promisor‘s efforts to lead the promisee on, and the promisee‘s
own belief that she was in a legally enforceable contract. Consider – in this
light – the famous case of Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores.157 Hoffman may be an
outlier case in its suggestion that parties will routinely win back their reliance
costs in promissory estoppel actions in the absence of any mutual agreement
between the parties.158 But we suggest that conventional treatments of the case
may be too quick to dismiss Hoffman's claim, and the court's outcome. In
Hoffman, Red Owl (the promisor) allegedly told Hoffman that his $18,000
proposed investment in their franchise "would not be a problem." If Hoffman
believed that this response constituted a contractual commitment – even
though it clearly was not one in the law's eyes – his later reliance might be more
easily explained and defended. Directing the law to ask directly about his
subjective understanding of the promise might not be an ideal solution.159 But
it would have the previously unexamined virtue of foregrounding the
vulnerability that the subjective experience of being in a contract creates in lay
promisees.
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is For Suckers, 63 VAND. L. REV.
1003 (2010).
153 See, e.g., Restatement 2nd Section 90: a promise that the "promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance on the part of the . . . .")
154. Cf. John J. Chung, Promissory Estoppel and the Protection of Interpersonal Trust, 56 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 37, 50–51 (2008) (discussing the differences between trust and reliance).
155 Wilkinson-Ryan and Hoffman, supra n. 152, at 138.
156. See Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 943, 959 (noting that some courts
suggest that promisees must demonstrate that they believed a promise legally enforceable to
obtain relief under section 90).
157 26 Wis. 2d 683 (Wisconsin 1965).
158 For an extended argument against the Hoffman holding and against treating it as a
typical promissory estoppel case, see Robert E. Scott, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores and the Myth
of Precontractual Reliance, in CONTRACT LAW STORIES 62 (Douglas Baird, ed., 2007).
159 For example, testimony about subjective belief may be unreliable and thus lead to jury
confusion.
152
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Limitations

Our study is subject to several limitations and possible criticisms. We
discuss concerns regarding the scope of our findings, criticisms common to all
survey research, the representativeness of our survey population, and the utility
of examining lay psychology in contract law.
Our response measures were either general attitudinal scales, or prompts
asking subjects for their hypothetical willingness to pay (or accept) money. A
typical concern with such research is that survey respondents without real
monetary incentives will overstate their commitment to contracting, so as to
signal that they are the kind of person who keeps promises.160 Of course there
is considerable literature which finds, to the contrary, that attitudinal scales
accurately predict behavior.161 But in real world contracts with more at stake,
individuals may tend to behave in a more economically maximizing manner.
Perhaps subjects in our experiments were motivated to demonstrate how
important mere contract status was to them, and thus were even less likely to
purchase precautions against breach. Further work, which triangulates across
survey populations, includes laboratory games, real-money stimuli, and
distinctive counterparties, could help build confidence in our findings.162
Our two subject pools pose distinct questions about bias. Experiments 1
and 2 were conducted on respondents drawn from workers at Amazon
Mechanical Turk. Recent research on AMT subjects has found them to be
significantly more representative of the general population than the ordinary
undergraduate samples.163 However, women are generally overrepresented–as
we found–and subjects are slightly better educated than the population
mean.164 This could raise concerns. In other areas of study, women and men
exhibit different risk preferences (especially regarding financial risk).165
However, we found no meaningful gender differences in responses. A more
See Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115,
1156-59 (2003) (discussing external validity concerns typical of prospect theory research);
Yuval Feldman, Attitudes and Behavior, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN
AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 102 (David S. Clark ed., 2007) (discussing concerns with survey
experiments).
161 Feldman and Teichman, supra n. 89, at 46.
162 See, e.g., Dan Simon, In Praise of Pedantic Eclecticism: Pitfalls and Opportunities in the Psychology
of Judging, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 131, 143 (David Klein &
Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010).
163
Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk. 5 JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 411 (2010); David Rand, The promise of Mechanical Turk: How online labor
markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. J. THEO. BIO. (forthcoming), at
http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~drand/rand_jtb_2011.pdf
164 Paolacci et al., id. at 412.
165 Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common
Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261, 264-66 (2001) (men are more risk seeking than women)
160
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pressing concern is that subjects recruited online to complete surveys may lack
motivation to pay attention to the task.166 In our work, we dropped
respondents who completed their tasks in a very short period of time, or who
skipped questions, but future work could incorporate more robust
manipulation checks against inattentive participants.167
With respect to Experiment 3, which studied incoming law students, we
face a different set of questions. Some have argued that individuals trained in
law may be more attentive to the legal remedies surrounding contracting
and/or less sensitive to the expressive power of contracting.168 Our subjects,
who were recruited in the first week of their orientation, are unlikely to be
similarly biased by legal doctrine.169 Anecdotally, law students are more risk
averse than the population at large, and thus possibly more likely to purchase
precautions against breach. It seems unlikely, however, this effect would be
mediated by being in a contract.
A different external validity objection presents in response to papers about
contracts in particular. As the relational contracting school famously
illustrated, contracting behavior by commercial parties can wildly unsettle prior
expectations about the importance of law and legal rules.170 Thus, the
argument goes, we ought to focus experimental work on the agents of
sophisticated commercial parties, who are likely to be repeat players in contract
litigation. For example, Daniel Markovits and Alan Schwartz, defending the
primacy of the expectation interest, argued recently that experiments like the
ones presented in this Article ought to be discounted in part because they
study ―individual persons, not firms. A firm is more likely to exhibit behavior
consistent with the maximization of monetary returns than an individual
responding to a questionnaire.‖171
We agree and disagree with this critique. It is quite useful to study the
behavior of sophisticated commercial parties engaging in contracting–contract
law gained immensely from the insights of the Wisconsin School. Bringing
such parties into the laboratory, though logistically quite challenging, holds real
Paolacci et al., supra n. 163, at 413.
Daniel Oppenheimer et al., Instructional manipulation checks: Detecting satisﬁcing to increase
statistical power, 45 J. EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 867 (2009).
168 See Feldman and Teichman, supra n. 89, at 47.
169 In an interesting experiment, Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv, and Daniel Markovits
observe that even one semester‘s worth of law school education may change students‘
distributional preferences in the Dictator game. See Exposure to Ideology and Distributional
Preferences, Working Paper available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/~kariv/FKM_II.pdf
170 See, e.g., Macaulay, supra n. 82; Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action,
98 MICH. L. REV. 2678 (2000); Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992
WIS. L. REV. 1.
171 Alan Schwartz & Daniel Markovits, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses of the
Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939, 1954 n.32 (2011).
166
167
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promise in expanding the burgeoning literature relating professionalism,
agency, and behavior.172
However, this argument cuts both ways. We note first that the extant
literature has focused on how post-trial remedies will influence pre-breach
precautionary behavior. That is, the literature assumes that almost all contracts
are litigable. But in the kinds of contracts which are the subject of our
experimental series, the availability of damage remedies for breach is practically
irrelevant. No one will sue, or recover, in a contracts case with so little at stake
outside the rough justice of small claims court. And, only moderately less
controversially, even if these contracts were large enough to make suits
economically worthwhile, lawsuits by individuals are likely to be driven
reputational and emotional factors that aren‘t easy to predict ex ante.173 Thus,
though studying the agents of repeat, commercially sophisticated, parties is
quite useful, it would not tell us much about the behavior of lay players in
typical consumer contracts, who are unlikely to ever experience contract
remedies in action.174
More generally, simply because the contracts we have described aren‘t
likely to be litigated does not mean that they shouldn‘t bear on the makeup of
doctrine. The theory of default rules rests on assumptions about the behavior
of legally unsophisticated members of the population–both majoritarian and
information-forcing penalty defaults, for instance, rest on (sometimes)
informed guesses about the views of the population mean.175 As we described
above, our understanding of offer-and-acceptance, promissory estoppel, and
modification similarly rests on intuitions about how ―ordinary‖ people will
behave. That those individuals will almost never actually show up to court to
testify about their precontracting intuitions doesn‘t mean that such intuitions
ought to be discounted. Indeed, it is a mark against the current literature on
precautions that it focuses so heavily on how promisees and promisors will
react to damage measures, when those remedies are unlikely to be known,
appreciated, or experienced by the vast majority of individuals participating in
commercial life.
See, e.g., Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment & Litigation ,
59 VAND. L. REV. 2017 (2006) (reporting that decisionmakers at insurance firms were less
prone to anchoring, framing and self-serving biases)
173 As an example, it‘s well-established that certain kinds of apologies will provoke
settlements, though such apologies must be perceived to be genuine to be effective. Jennifer
K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460,
482-89 (2003).
174 This is not to say that they might not learn about such remedies indirectly through the
actions of creditors. Mark P. Gergen, A Theory of Self-Help Remedies in Contract, 89 B.U. L. REV.
1397, 1397-1401 (2009) (discussing self-help rules).
175 See, e.g., See George S. Geis, Empirically Assessing Hadley v. Baxendale, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
Rev. 897, 921-49 (2005)
172
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Finally, some have argued that legal rules, if they drift too far from
common moral intuitions, would come to be seen as illegitimate and thus less
likely to influence behavior.176 This literature is admittedly controversial.177
However, it is the case that if individuals were to come to believe that
common contracting rules were written exclusively to respond to the views of
sophisticated, repeat-player, commercial parties, then it is possible that they
would come to distrust the rules which resulted from such elite inquiries.
Indeed, doctrine would likely come to be seen as the product of capture, or, in
layman‘s terms, corruption. Courts ought to be at least informed of how
ordinary, legally-naïve citizens think about the kinds of contracts they typically
enter into. What they do with such knowledge is another matter entirely.
5. Conclusion
Everyone knows that contract parties behave differently toward one
another than do strangers. The question is why. The dominant paradigm in
contract theory assumes that parties, forecasting their remedies with
impressive precision, tailor their investment in the bargain and their behavior
optimally
to
maximize
their
individual
gains.
This
may
explained conventionally by transaction costs, or forecasted remedies
following legally enforceable bargains. Instead, the moment of contracting
resets the status quo and primes a cognitive script that favors trust in contract.
This reframed understanding of self-protective behavior by promisees might
help us to reorient some important questions in current doctrine. We are
hopeful that this is the first step in the larger project of understanding why,
and when, individuals surrender their armor and treat their contracts as
partnerships.

See generally Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for
Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007).
177 See Christopher Slobogin, Some Hypotheses About Empirical Desert, 42 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1189,
1193-1198 (2011) (arguing that individuals either won‘t notice departure from ordinary
intuitions about punishment or won‘t care); cf. Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, and David A.
Hoffman, Some Realism about Punishment Naturalism, 77 U CHI. L. REV. 1531, 1566-92 (2010)
(arguing that individuals‘ views about the morality of punishment are culturally contingent).
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